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1Approaches to Delegation in EU Foreign Policy: 
The Case of the Commission
2013
Hylke Dijkstra
This is a preprint of a chapter whose final and definitive form is forthcoming in M. Wilga and I. 
Karolewski (eds), New Approaches to EU Foreign Policy, London: Routledge.
INTRODUCTION
One of the great  untold stories of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) concerns the role  of the European 
Commission in foreign policy. Prior to the Treaty, the Commission had considerable diplomatic 
resources.  Its  Directorate-General  for External  Relations (DG RELEX) employed,  for  example, 
several hundreds of officials. The Commission had political and strategic control over a sizeable 
development  budget  making  it  one  of  the  world's  largest  donors.  In  addition,  it  had  130+ 
delegations in third countries at its disposal. In many ways, the Commission was thus a formidable 
diplomatic actor. With one paragraph in the Lisbon Treaty, however, the Member States have taken 
these resources away. These resources have been transferred to the new European External Action 
Service (EEAS), over which the Member States have considerable more control. Because European 
integration is often characterized as an 'ever closer union', this re-nationalisation of foreign policy is 
important. It merits attention.
To understand these institutional developments, this chapter takes a step back and asks why 
the Member States have delegated functions to the Commission in the first place. By analysing the 
rationale for delegation, it not only seeks to explain recent developments. It also wants to contribute 
to  theorizing  the  role  of  the  European Union (EU)  institutions  more  broadly.1 The  role  of  the 
Commission in foreign policy has been the subject of various publications by (former) officials and 
think tank experts (e.g. Nuttall 1992, 1997, 2000; Duke 2006; Spence 2006). While these provide a 
wealth  of  empirical  material,  hardly  any  attempt  has  been  made  to  theorize  the  role  of  the 
Commission  in  the  second  pillar.2 This  is  surprising.  The  core  theoretical  debate  in  European 
integration,  after all,  constitutes the relations between the Member States and the supranational 
institutions (e.g. Haas 1958; Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1998; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; 
Pollack 2003). By expanding the empirical domain of EU integration theory to the area of foreign 
policy, this chapter thus makes an innovative theoretical contribution.
The argument is that the Member States, at various moments in time, have delegated tasks to 
the Commission out of a functional need to bridge the divide between economic integration and 
foreign policy – e.g. the first and second pillars of the Maastricht Treaty (1993). Foreign policy 
coordination  in  the EU initially  developed separately from the  economic  integration due  to  its 
sensitive nature. With many overlapping grey areas, however, there was a demand for consistency. 
1 This chapter is only concerned with European Political Cooperation (1970-1993) and the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (1993-date). It is not interested in the wider domain of external relations. 
2 Smith (2004) is a notable exception, but he does not specifically deal with the role of the Commission.
2The Commission was, due to its expertise of the internal market and knowledge of the  acquis  
communitaire, best placed to provide it.3 The Member States therefore delegated, time and again, 
tasks to the Commission relating to consistency in order to improve the process and quality of 
policy-making. With the creation of the External Action Service, which key rationale was to bring 
the different strands of external relations together, there is no longer a purpose for the Commission 
in foreign policy.
In the first section of this chapter, three competing explanations of delegation are discussed 
– credible commitments, efficiency and mimetic isomorphism. The chapter subsequently studies the 
most important historical instances of the delegation and non-delegation of tasks to the Commission 
in the realm of foreign policy (1970-2009) in order to shed a light on the underlying rationales of 
the Member States. Studying non-delegation is important, as it tells us why Member States did not 
equip  the  Commission  with  additional  powers.  In  terms of  data,  this  chapter  relies  on official  
documents, preparatory reports, secondary literature, and where necessary on a limited number of 
semi-structured interviews.
DELEGATION TO SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
The research agenda on delegation in the EU is substantial. Yet like in much of the rest of social  
science, there is an ontological split between explanations based on rationalism and constructivism. 
The rationalist research agenda is, needless to say, more comprehensive. This has partially to do 
with the fact that intentionality by definition better fits an agency perspective. There is, however, no 
good  reason  why  the  reasons  of  the  Member  States  for  delegation  cannot  be  studied  from  a 
constructivist  perspective. This chapter suggests three competing explanations based on credible 
commitments, efficiency and mimetic isomorphism. 
Credible Commitments
The most prominent rationalist explanation behind the delegation of powers to the supranational 
institutions in the EU, such as the Commission, is that they improve the credibility of commitments  
(e.g. Moravcsik 1998; Pollack 2003; Franchino 2007). Supranational institutions can act as neutral 
monitors to check whether the Member States are indeed implementing their agreements. They thus 
increase the confidence amongst the Member States. In case of possible infringement, supranational 
institutions can also be given a role in enforcing the agreements. In the most extreme cases, the  
Member States can even delegate exclusive implementation powers to supranational institutions, if 
they do not trust each other – for example the European Central Bank in setting the interest rate, or 
the competition prerogatives of the Commission (Majone 1996). Finally, supranational institutions 
play a role when it comes to incomplete contracting. If the Member States sign up for a treaty, they 
should not be in a position of undermining or blocking that  treaty when negotiating secondary 
legislation or interpreting the treaty. Delegating specific tasks to supranational institutions can help 
to prevent that (Hawkins et al. 2006).
What all these reasons for delegation have in common is that distribution is at the core of the 
analysis. Member States gain through cooperation, but because they have different interests, there is 
almost always the ex post risk of defection or freeridership. This may affect the distribution of gains 
initially  agreed.  By  getting  a  relatively  impartial  third  party  involved,  Member  States  try  to 
institutionalize their bargain (Keohane 1984; Moravcsik 2009). The more formal power, which is 
delegated to supranational institutions, the bigger the chance that they can uphold the agreement 
(Tallberg 2002). As Member States are generally keen on their sovereignty, the amount of autonomy 
3 This argument bears resemblance with Nuttall (1992, 2000). His approach is, however, historical and he does not  
identify a causal relationship between the functional need for consistency, based on a careful cost-benefit analysis on  
the side of the Member States, and the delegation of tasks to the European Commission.
3is  also likely  to  be topic of  debate.  Member States with  outside alternatives are  least  wary of  
defection. They may want to keep their prerogatives, while others are likely to prefer more formal 
autonomy for the supranational institutions. If credible commitments is indeed the main explanation 
for the delegation of tasks to the Commission in the CFSP, one would thus expect the negotiations  
to focus on how to institutionalize the distribution of gains from cooperation and how much formal 
autonomy it should have.
Efficiency of Policy-Making
Another reason for the delegation of tasks is to increase the efficiency of policy-making. Having a 
chairmanship, which presides over the deliberations is an obvious example (Tallberg 2006). Other 
common practices, which increase the efficiency of cooperation, include the position of an informal 
honest broker or outsourcing the conference centre to an international secretariat. Contrary to the 
institutions for the purpose of credible commitments, these institutions lower the  ex ante costs of 
reaching agreements and generally do not require the transfer of substantial competences (Majone 
2001; Tallberg 2002). They affect the distribution of the gains of cooperation to a lesser extent and 
often generate positive-sum rather than re-distributive payoffs. They can help the Member States to 
increase their gains from cooperation by guiding them to the Pareto optimal agreements (e.g. Beach 
2005; Tallberg 2006).
Two other reasons for delegation are informational input and external representation. Due to 
its complexity, foreign policy requires informational input and expertise during the agenda-setting, 
decision-making and implementation phase  (Pollack 2003;  Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).  This 
counts particularly for the joint actions in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). Member States can perform information-gathering and analysis functions themselves, but 
in  case  of  joint  actions  and decisions,  it  is  more  effective  to  pool  their  scarce  diplomatic  and 
military  resources  (Dijkstra  and  Vanhoonacker  2011).  Collective  representation  is  another 
functional need that makes cooperation more efficient (Tallberg 2006). It is better, after all, to speak 
with one clear voice – when in agreement – then with several. While Member States might like to 
keep external representation in their own hands, they will have a hard time determining which of 
them presents the collectivity. Delegating these tasks to supranational institutions is not only a way 
to avoid such debate; these institutions are due to their continuity also better capable of performing 
these functions than other sub-optimal alternatives, such as the rotating Presidency.
In line with continuity is the need for overall foreign policy consistency (e.g. Hill 2003). 
Payoffs of foreign policy decisions and actions are generally higher, if they are consistent with other 
decisions and actions. Consistency comes in different forms. Nuttall (2005) points, for example, to 
the need for vertical consistency between the EU and national level. In addition, he argues there is a 
demand for horizontal consistency between the various policy areas of the EU (e.g. development 
and agriculture). Finally, there is institutional consistency. This is notoriously difficult to achieve in 
the EU, because with its pillar structure artificially separates the external dimension of economic 
integration from foreign  policy proper  (Stetter  2007;  Nuttall  2005;  Zielonka 1998).  To give an 
example, it makes no sense to train police forces in a third country, which falls under foreign policy,  
while neglecting the administrative capacity of the judiciary, a justice and home affairs issue. Thus, 
given the particular institutional structure of the EU, there is a demand for coordination.4
Supranational  institutions  can  do  little  to  improve  vertical  consistency,  as  they  are  by 
definition only part of the supranational polity, but they are often in a good position to help Member 
States reaching horizontal and institutional consistency. The strengths of supranational institutions 
are, in this respect, to be found in the continuity of their officials vis-à-vis the permanently rotating 
diplomats and in their ability to coordinate between different strands of foreign policy due to their  
limited size and compartmentalization, and their restricted departmental autonomy (cf. ministries in 
4 The Treaty of Lisbon has an impact on cross-pillar relations and it thus affects the demand for coordination.
4the capitals). In the particular case of the EU, furthermore, there is an additional reason to delegate 
tasks dealing with institutional consistency to the Commission. Given that it has the exclusive right 
of initiative in the first pillar, it can use the information it gets in the second pillar to inform its first 
pillar legislation. Furthermore, the Commission has unrivalled expertise about the internal market 
and the acquis communautaire. Such first pillar expertise is in short supply with the second pillar 
officials of the various Member States. Thus in the particular case of the EU, the functional demand 
for consistency is high and the Commission is well-placed to provide it.
Mimetic isomorphism
A competing constructivist explanation for delegation – mimetic isomorphism – has its roots in 
metaphor  of  'muddling  through'.  Lindblom  (1959:  80)  stated  that  while  policy-makers  ideally 
engage in extensive and comprehensive cost/benefit analyses, such approach “assumes intellectual 
capacities and sources of information that men simply do not possess, and it is even more absurd as 
an approach to policy when time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is limited, as  
is always the case”. Member States are therefore likely, under the condition of uncertainty, to copy 
the institutional arrangements of other successful well-functioning international organisations. They 
use institutional formats that they as legitimate or appropriate (Powell and DiMaggio 1983; March 
and Olsen 1989). This makes rationality at best historically and/or culturally grounded (McNamara 
2002). The result is that supranational institutions not necessarily fit with the actual functions they 
are supposed to perform. This leads to sub-optimal outcomes (Pierson 2004; McNamara 2002). 
According to Powell and DiMaggio (1983), there are two conditions under which mimetic 
behaviour is likely to occur: uncertainty between the means and ends of an organisation as well as 
ambiguity about the goals of an organisation. Both seem relevant in EU foreign policy. When the 
Member States established a new system for foreign policy coordination in the early 1970s, they did 
not have much of an idea how it would work and they definitely did not know where it was going to 
(its  finalité). The question that remains is, however, which institutional forms were conceived as 
legitimate and formed the basis for the new structure of the foreign policy system and the delegation 
to the Commission. There were, in this respect, two important albeit competing norms. Firstly, there 
was  the  economic  integration  with  its  'Community  method'  and  its  consensual  norms  (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006; Lewis 1998). If this template was also the basis for foreign policy 
cooperation,  one  would  expect  a  significant  role  for  the  Commission.  Secondly,  there was the 
Westphalian diplomacy with the strong notion of sovereignty. A system based on such norm would 
hardly  leave  room  to  supranational  actors.  In  the  constructivist  explanation  of  delegation,  the 
Commission is thus likely to be caught in a more general debate over these norms rather than over 
specific functions leading to misfit.
Table 1. Competing explanations of delegation
Explanation Relevant questions during the negotiations
Credible commitments How to guarantee the agreed distribution of the gains of cooperation?
Efficiency How to improve the process of policy-making?
Mimetic isomorphism How to create legitimate and appropriate institutions? 
Source: Compiled by the author
HISTORICAL INSTANCES OF (NON)-DELEGATION
The sovereignty concerns of the Member States have been a constant factor throughout the history 
of EU foreign policy coordination. The ambitious plans for a European Defence Community failed 
5ratification in the French National Assembly due to Gaullist opposition (Parsons 2006), while the 
subsequent Fouchet Plans – quintessentially Gaullist themselves – were vetoed by The Netherlands 
and Belgium, because these states feared that these plans would weaken their role as small Member 
States (Vanke 2006).  When the Member States tried for the third time to create  foreign policy 
coordination, they thus went for the lowest common denominator. The Luxembourg Report (1970), 
which  established  European  Political  Cooperation  (EPC)  only  envisaged  a  process  limited  to 
“exchanging information and consulting regularly [and] joint action when it appears feasible and 
desirable”. It was placed outside the Treaty framework and because previous attempts broke down 
over the institutional structure, EPC was “provided with a bare minimum of institutional support” 
(Smith 2004: 71). There were consultations at ministerial, political director and working group level 
and these meetings took place in the country holding the rotating Presidency. Due to disagreement 
about the location of a permanent secretariat, the Member States did without: administrative support 
was in the hands of the Presidency.
The Commission was kept at arm's length from EPC, yet it was not completely ignored. In 
boundaries dossiers between EPC and the activities of the European Communities, it was to “be 
consulted” (article 5). The Commission was thus invited when cross-pillar issues were discussed, 
but invitations were not automatic. Time and again it had to fight for a place at the table. Some 
scholars see this link with the European Communities as a concession by France in order for the  
integrationist Member States to sell EPC domestically as different from the Fouchet plans (Nuttall 
1992; Smith 2004). Yet this ignores its specific function. The Member States also clearly required 
the economic expertise of Commission in many of their negotiations with third states. In one of the 
first foreign policy dossiers on the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(1973-1975), for example, the Commission’s role started divisively, but even the French Presidency 
recognized that its  input  on negotiations about  the economic  basket  was indispensable (Nuttall 
1997; interview national official, 2008). The Commission thus provided its expertise, because there 
was a functional demand for consistency.
The original stalemates between the intergovernmentalists and supranationalists prevented 
significant further institutional development during the 1970s. It was only in the early 1980s that 
EPC regained institutional momentum. The failure of the EU foreign policy machinery resulting 
from discontinuity between two Presidencies following the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (1979) 
was important in this respect. It made Member States realize that they had to improve procedures.  
In  the  London  Report  (1981),  they  introduced  the  Troika  in  order  to  create  continuity.  The 
Commission  became  furthermore  'fully  associated'  with  the  conduct  of  EPC,  which  meant  in 
practice that it gained automatic access to all meetings and information. It undoubtedly helped that 
France had a new (non-Gaullist) government with Cheysson as the foreign minister. As a former 
Commissioner,  he  had  experienced the  problematic  relationship  with  EPC and  appreciated  the 
specific needs of the Commission. This instance highlights the importance of past experience.
While the London Report already signalled the increased foreign policy ambition that would 
guide much of the 1980s, it was also the end of an epoch. Until the London Report, EPC developed 
outside the Treaty framework. Subsequent discussions turned to how to give EPC a formal Treaty 
base. This was, of course, not a neutral legalistic exercise:  the integrationist  Member States, in 
particular, saw it as an opportunity to bring the Communities and Political Cooperation closer in  
order to strengthen the role of the Commission. The first serious initiative, in this respect, was the 
draft  European  Act  co-sponsored  by  the  German  and  Italian  foreign  ministers  Genscher  and 
Colombo (1981). While this proposal was intergovernmental in intent, leaving the separation in 
decision-making procedures (including the limited powers of the Commission), it did constitute a 
single  institutional  framework.  For  some Member  States  this  was  still  too  much  (Smith  2002; 
Nuttall  1992).  The  Heads  of  State  and  Government  simply  took  note  of  the  proposal  and 
diplomatically invited the foreign ministers to examine it. 
The ministers discussed the plan extensively, but it did not add up also in the absence of 
6clear functional needs.  Their deliberations eventually resulted in the Solemn Declaration on the 
European Union (1983), which was a non-binding document that reiterated much of the already 
established  practice.  Discussions  on  the  future  status  of  EPC  also  played  in  the  European 
Parliament. Under the leadership of Altiero Spinelli, it  adopted the draft Treaty Establishing the 
European Union (1984), which brought EPC and the Communities together, albeit with different 
decision-making procedures. The parliamentary draft Treaty only to a limited extent enhanced the 
role of the Commission by giving it the shared right of initiative (article 67(1)). On foreign policy it 
was thus more pragmatic than ideological. Few Member States were, however, willing to work on 
the basis of the parliamentary draft, let alone to ratify it instantly (Nuttall 1992: 240). While all  
these proposals in  the early 1980s thus ultimately failed,  they did help to spread the idea of a 
possible codification of political cooperation.
Before going, however, to the negotiations of the Single European Act, which eventually led 
to the codification of cooperation, it is necessary to look at the development of the informal role of 
the Commission. Its full association of the London Report marked the conclusion of the debates in 
the 1970s on whether it should be invited at all. From the early 1980s, it started to make use of its  
access to Communities resources to yield political influence in the context of political cooperation. 
The use of sanctions, in this respect, stand out. Whereas over Rhodesia (1975), South Africa (1976-
1977) and Iran (1979-1980) the Member States could not agree on the timely use of  Community 
sanctions, they were successful in the case of Poland after the Soviet crackdown of the Solidarity 
movement  (1982) (ibid.:  261-262).  Since Greece opposed action  in the  context  of  EPC, where 
consensus was still the rule, the Member States resorted to Community article 113 (currently article 
133), which gave them more flexibility,  but it  also meant that they put the Commission in the 
driving seat. While the Member States literally forgot to invite the Commission for discussions over 
Iran, it was COREPER and the Commission which looked into import restrictions against the Soviet  
Union (ibid.: 170 and 203)!
The pattern repeated itself over the Falkland Islands (1982) where Community sanctions, 
despite internal differences, were agreed upon within two weeks (Edwards 1984). Similarly in 1985, 
Belgium made any bilateral restrictive measures against South Africa conditional on Community 
implementation. When the Member States used sanctions against Iraq (1990), it had been widely 
accepted  that  article  113 was the standard operating procedure  (Nuttall  1992: 264).  During the 
1980s, the Commission thus started to play a more important role in the context of political foreign 
policy through the use of sanctions in the domain of the Community (Bonvicini 1988: 65). This 
was, however, the result of an explicit decision by the Member States to go through the Community 
rather  than  through  the  EPC  machinery.  It  subsequently  led  to  a  clear  functional  need  for 
consistency between the activities of EPC (political decisions to use sanctions) and the European 
Communities (implementation of sanctions) and the Member States tasked the Commission to make 
the connections.
The Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty 
The momentum for Treaty change was generated by a speech of President Mitterrand in front of the 
European Parliament (23 May 1984), where he called for a new Treaty. This led to the  Ad hoc 
Committee on Institutional Affairs chaired by the Irish senator James Dooge. Its report was modest 
on  foreign  policy  and  not  much  different  from  the  Genscher-Colombo  Act:  the  role  of  the 
Commission  was  not  strengthened.  Before  the  Member States  were,  however,  in  a  position  to 
comment on the report at the Milan European Council (June 1985), they were faced with a new 
proposal by the United Kingdom and very similar draft text of Germany and France. The British 
proposal was a codification of established practices – though not a formal Treaty – which included 
even the option of excluding the Commission from the foreign policy deliberations. It did, however, 
propose a permanent low-level supporting secretariat for EPC. The Franco-German proposal was a 
7formal Treaty with no exclusion of the Commission and with a high-level political secretariat. A 
combination of all these proposals finally led to the Single European Act. 
The preparatory work for this draft treaty was delegated to the Political Committee and it 
soon became clear that the British approach was the best way forward (Nuttall 1992: 249). During 
the negotiations, the Commission stated its preference “at the end of the day only united institutions 
– one Council, one Parliament, one Commission” (Opinion on Intergovernmental Conference). It 
explained that this did not imply a change in the very nature of decision-making, but rather that it 
wanted to bring the Communities and Political Cooperation together in one legal document yet with 
different titles. This idea formed the basis of the French draft act (19 November). Yet whereas the 
Commission had pleaded for an eventual rapprochement, no such reference was made in the French 
document. This proposal on the institutional structure was finally accepted – the  Single European 
Act.  Apart  from codification,  the Single European Act  brought  two things.  Firstly,  it  created a 
consistency requirement between the Communities and Political Cooperation after this had played 
so prominently in the sanctions dossiers. The Presidency and Commission were explicitly tasked to 
look after it. This gave the Commission an incentive to structure its bureaucracy in a way that it 
would be able to bridge the divide.  It  created an EPC Directorate in the Secretariat-General  to 
coordinate the work of the Directorates-General (Nuttall 2000: 25). Secondly, the Single European 
Act established a small-scale and low-level permanent EPC secretariat.
While the Single European Act only marginally strengthened the Commission in the context 
of EPC, it was the international events shortly after the codification of cooperation that would have 
a lasting effect on its informal position in foreign policy. Particularly, the fall of the Berlin Wall  
(1989) was important. It had an impact on the role of the Commission in two ways. Firstly, due to 
its knowledge of the acquis communautaire, the Commission became a key actor in the discussions 
over German reunification. The German Democratic Republic, after all, had to be integrated into 
the Federal Republic, but also into the European Communities. The alignment of the Democratic 
Republic took place under immense time pressures and over the summer a small group of high-level  
Commission officials worked in close liaison with the German government to make reunification 
technically happen. Secondly, the Commission became the coordinator of international aid for the 
Central and Eastern European countries. France was not in favour, yet it was the United States that 
thought  that  the  Commission  would  be  best  placed  to  do  the  job.  The  functional  need  for  
consistency between the activities of the Communities and Political  Cooperation thus led to an 
active role for the Commission in the most salient EPC dossiers of the day.
Its  central  position  during  these  events  following  1989  was  an  important  input  for  the 
Maastricht Treaty (1993), which aimed at upgrading foreign policy coordination. The process that 
led to the Treaty was similar to the Single European Act with proposals rotating from almost every 
member state. Already at a relatively early stage, during the Rome European Council (December 
1990), the outline of the eventual agreement became visible, but it took Member States another year 
to reach final agreement. With regard to foreign policy coordination, the two extreme proposals 
were to continue the status quo in terms of institutional structure or to finally merge the structures 
of  the  Communities  and  EPC.  While  the  Commission  entered  the  negotiations  with  renewed 
confidence  and  urged  for  a  qualitative  leap  forward,  its  Opinion  on  the  Intergovernmental 
Conference (21 October 1990) fell short of a complete rapprochement. It acknowledged the “very 
specific nature of foreign and security policy”, in which it was better to share the right of initiative 
with the Member States. The Commission furthermore interestingly suggested creating an expert 
bureaucracy for preparing foreign policy decisions consisting of the small-scale EPC Secretariat and 
representatives of the Commission to be located in the Council Secretariat. 
After the infamous Black Monday of the Dutch Presidency (30 September 1991), however, 
all integrationist options were off the table. On the basis of earlier Franco-German proposals and the  
Luxembourg Presidency draft Treaty (18 June 1991), the pillar structure was introduced, which kept 
economic integration and foreign policy cooperation neatly separate. Some Member States were 
8clearly not satisfied with the higher profile of the Commission and wanted to put it back in its box 
(interview  national  official;  Commission  official).  The  Commission  did  get  a  shared  right  of 
initiative,  but it  would continue to play a secondary role. In terms of external representation,  it 
became fully associated with the Troika. The EPC Secretariat  was furthermore merged with the 
Council Secretariat and became known as the CFSP unit. It consisted of 26 a-grade officials and its 
purpose was to further support the Presidency (e.g. Nuttall 1992; Dijkstra 2008). In terms of the 
institutional structure, little changed and the Maastricht Treaty can be characterized as business as 
usual.
The Treaty did not discuss the intra-institutional politics of the Commission or the inter-
institutional relations between the Commission and the Council. Despite the set-back in Maastricht,  
the Commission leadership thought that the Commission should become an equal player  to the 
larger Member States (interview Commission official 2008). It therefore established the position of 
Commissioner for External Political Relations as well as a new Directorate-General. However for 
various reasons – stringent staff constraints and bureaucratic conflicts – these “new arrangements 
caused more problems than they brought benefits”  (Nuttall  1997: 317),  which hindered it  from 
making use of the shared right of initiative (Nuttall 2000; Duke 2006; Cameron 2007;  Dijkstra 
2009). Interviewees from the Commission also argue that it did not make sense to come up with 
proposals and defend them in front of the Member States, because it did not have necessary foreign 
policy expertise. The Commission furthermore preferred to pursue external relations under the first 
pillar where it had more formal power. The initiative thus remained with the Presidency, which in 
turn increasingly started looking at the Council Secretariat’s CFSP unit for administrative support 
and informational input (Dijkstra 2008).
The Amsterdam Treaty
That the institutional machinery had not much changed became obvious during the Bosnian War 
(1992-1995). European Member States were not able to bring this conflict to a halt and watched 
how the Americans negotiated the Dayton agreement. It was thus unsurprising that the Reflection 
Group, in charge of preparing the Amsterdam Treaty stressed in the preamble of its report “that the  
time  has  come  to  provide  this  common  policy  with  the  means  to  function  more  effectively” 
(Reflection Group 1995). For this purpose, it discussed how to improve the various phases of the 
foreign policy cycle. For the 'preparatory phase' (i.e. agenda-setting) it foresaw an analytical expert 
bureaucracy without formal powers. While the report was inconclusive on its location, the majority 
of the members of the group preferred the Council Secretariat for “the merit  of abiding by the 
present institutional framework by not creating any new bodies” (ibid.). At the same time, “a broad 
majority of members point … to the need to involve the Commission in forecasting and analysis … 
in  order  to  avoid  inconsistency  between  the  political  dimension  and  the  external  economic 
dimension of the Union” (ibid.).  This body became the Policy Unit  of the Council  Secretariat. 
Functions of an informational nature were thus not delegated to the Commission, yet the discussion 
over the specifics in terms of efficiency and consistency were striking, leading to a Commission 
liaison in the Policy Unit.
The Westendorp Report also discussed the 'personification of CFSP' in order for the Union 
“to implement its external actions with a higher profile” (ibid). While some members favoured a 
“Mr or Ms CFSP” to be located in the Commission, because of consistency and its resources, “for 
the majority, this would be someone in the Council” (ibid). The report furthermore stressed that 
inter-institutional tensions needed to be avoided. The Member States eventually created the position 
of  the  High Representative  of  the  CFSP in  the  Council  Secretariat  with  a  strong  emphasis  of 
collective representation in addition to the rotating Presidency. The main representational function 
in CFSP was thus also not delegated to the Commission. It only became part of the newly formed 
Troika. What was more, many observers at the time foresaw problems between the new executive 
9tasks of the Council Secretariat and the Commission, particular after the Member States nominated 
the high-level candidate Javier Solana as the High Representative (e.g. Allen 1998). This raised 
speculations  over  whether  the  Member  States  would  indirectly  try  to  get  back  some  of  their 
prerogatives.
The creation of the post of High Representative and supporting services did indeed affect the 
European Commission. The expected tensions in the field of traditional foreign policy (diplomacy, 
representation) were, however, surprisingly limited (Crowe 2003; Patten 2005). Solana was mainly 
busy with establishing his position vis-à-vis the Presidency, while External Relations Commissioner 
Patten chose exit over voice and decided to reorganise the Commission’s aid budgets and external 
delegations instead (Spence 2006). He was reluctant to confront Solana and preferred the pragmatic 
road: “If [the ministers in the Council] were obliged to choose between backing Javier Solana or 
me,  there  was  only  one  possible  outcome”  (Patten  2005:  156).  While  Solana  and  Patten  thus 
avoided confrontation, they also avoided collaboration. An interviewee, in this respect, notes “you 
will be surprised by the limited number of contacts between Solana and Patten”. The fact that the  
political leaders did not fight over turf had, however, a positive effect on cooperation between desk 
officers. These practices have continued despite problematic relations between External Relations 
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and Solana (Bengtsson and Allan 2011).
Whereas in traditional foreign policy the tensions were limited, the development of civilian 
crisis management in the second pillar in the context of the CSDP proved difficult (Schroeder 2007; 
Dijkstra  2009).  Within  the context  of  development  policy (first  pillar),  the Member States  had 
developed  a  whole  range  of  security-related  instruments  for  which  the  European  Commission 
became  responsible.  The  Commission,  for  example,  trained  police  services  in  the  Palestinian 
Territories, Guatemala, South Africa, Albania, Algeria and Macedonia. It supported border guards, 
strengthened judicial services in many of the Central and Eastern European Countries, and was in 
charge  of  tendering  de-mining  contracts.  The  Humanitarian  Office  and  the  Monitoring  and 
Information Centre (DG Environment) also did much in the field of civil protection with crisis 
management missions to Turkey, Iran, Morocco and the United States. Given that these actions all  
took place under the first pillar, the Commission had a particularly strong position. Small wonder 
that when the Member States at the Feira European Council (2000) decided to make police, rule of 
law, civil administration and civil protection the focal points of civilian CSDP missions, it feared for  
its competences.
The point here is thus not that the Commission played a strong role in the second pillar as 
part of CSDP, but that it was doing already very similar activities under the first pillar, which is 
again evidence of the artificial division between the two. This debate on what constitutes the first  
and second pillar eventually led to the ECOWAS/Small arms case (2008), in which the Court of 
Justice argued that cross-pillar cases should be dealt with under first pillar decision-making rules 
(Hoffmeister 2008; Van Vooren 2009). The Commission thus defended its first pillar competences 
and the Court reiterated that the Commission has a role to play in the cross-pillar dossiers. When it  
however comes to pure CSDP dossiers, the role of the Commission remains very limited. Its seat in 
the EU Military Committee, for example, was empty for a long time (Duke 2006), despite its full  
association,  because  it  felt  that  it  could  not  make  a  useful  contribution.  In  civilian  crisis 
management, it plays a more active role – for example through managing the CFSP budget as part 
of the wider Community budget – but various interviewees pointed to the fact that the Commission 
is much more active in the RELEX working group, which ensures cross-pillar coordination, than in 
the pure second pillar Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (CIVCOM).
The Constitutional Debate (2001-2008)
Many of these discussions took place in the shadow of the Constitutional debate. Even before the 
Nice Treaty – which had no effect  on the role of the Commission in CFSP – was ratified,  the 
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Member States launched the European Convention in the Laeken Declaration (15 December 2001). 
It  eventually  led  to  the  Constitution  and  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  As  regards  foreign  policy,  the 
Convention aimed particularly at  making it  more consistent  both at  the policy and institutional 
level.  The creation of the position of the 'double-hatted'  Foreign Minister  (High Representative 
under Lisbon) and the supporting European External Action Service stand out. By merging different 
strands of external relations in the EEAS, there is no longer a need for the Commission to provide 
horizontal and institutional consistency. Two observers, in this respect, argue that the Convention 
did “not extend the Commission's powers over foreign policy” (Everts and Keohane 2003: 171). For 
a project with some federalist pretensions in search of a finalité for Europe this is a rather sobering 
conclusion.
The rationale behind the merger of the posts of External Relations Commissioner and High 
Representative was to promote more consistency between Communities' and CFSP policies, on the 
one hand, and to decrease the number of political external representatives as well as related turf 
battles. Giving one person the power over diplomacy and the aid budgets would lead to more robust 
foreign  policy  action.  The Member  States,  however,  refused to  locate  this  new position  in  the 
Commission.  They  remain  the  formal  principals  of  the  High  Representative  and  thus  have 
additional  control.  A slight  qualification  is  that  the  Commission  has  ensured  that  the  High 
Representative did not get a privileged status amongst other the external relations Commissioners. 
Lady Ashton, for example, does not coordinate the trade and development Commissioners, despite 
her  Vice-Presidency  seat.  The  merger  of  the  High  Representative  position  with  the  External 
Relations Commissioner was not to strengthen the Commission, but rather as a half-hearted attempt 
to do something about consistency.
A similar rationale applies to the European External Action Service and the European Union 
External Delegations. These bodies bring together the officials from the Commission, the Council 
Secretariat  and  the  Member  States.  Apart  from  the  improvements  in  consistency  between  the 
bureaucracies, this should also lead to economies of scale when it comes to foreign policy expertise. 
Yet at the same time, the negotiations over the institutional structure of the External Action Service 
have shown the Commission being reluctant to pool its trade and even its development experts. It is 
furthermore an important observation that rather than making the External Action Service and the 
Union Delegations part of the Commission, they became independent, consisting also rather than 
solely  of  officials  from the  Commission.  To conclude,  there has  thus  been a  strong functional 
pressure for more consistency resulting from the expected problems between the Commission and 
the  Council  Secretariat  following  the  Amsterdam  Treaty  and  this  is  why  the  Member  States 
delegated tasks. They delegate those however to the EEAS, for which they used the Commission 
resources.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has given an overview of the historical instances of the (non-)delegation of tasks to the 
Commission in the area of foreign policy. The purpose was to understand why Member States have 
delegated tasks in the sensitive area of foreign policy.  The chapter has offered three competing 
theoretical explanations. The first explanation about credible commitments, which is the rationalist 
mainstream explanation in European integration theory, does not seem to be of much relevance in 
foreign policy coordination.  Second-order  concerns,  such as defection and freeridership,  do not 
block cooperation and they are not the subject of discussion. That the CFSP developed slowly and 
often fails to yield results has to do with first-order problems: different policy preferences of the 
Member States leading to ex ante rather than ex post failure. That credible commitments are not at 
the centre of the institutional debates in the various instances of (non-)delegation in EU foreign 
policy supports the proposition that the CFSP can be best conceptualized as a coordination rather 
than a collaboration game and that the integration logics of economic integration and foreign policy 
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coordination differ (Wagner 2003).
The constructivist explanation of mimetic isomorphism, in contrast, holds more explanatory 
power.  Throughout  the  institutional  development  of  the  CFSP,  there  has  been  a  vivid  debate 
between the proponents of the Community method and the guardians of national sovereignty. This 
debate did not only play in the very beginning, but also in the period leading up to the Single 
European  Act  as  well  as  the  Maastricht  and  the  Amsterdam Treaty.  There  is  furthermore  the 
continuous and persistent belief in certain ideas: that the  rapprochement between the Community 
and foreign policy coordination would be the end goal of institutional development. Other non-
calculative reasons also played a role.  The French foreign minister Cheysson was, for example, 
more receptive of the needs of the Commission, as he had been a Commissioner himself. Finally 
post-delegation, the self-restraint within the Commission on the extent to which it should play a role  
in  the foreign policy proper  is  interesting.  It  did not  use its  shared  right  of  initiative  after  the  
Maastricht Treaty or its seat in the EU Military Committee, because it thought that the Member 
States would not take its proposals seriously. The Commission, due to its lack of foreign policy 
expertise, had no legitimacy to play such role.
And yet mimetic isomorphism fails to explain why specific functions were delegated to the 
Commission  in  the  CFSP at  particular moments  in  time.  Of  all  the  possible  roles  that  the 
Commission could play, the Member States choose to delegate the task of consistency and rejected 
other  proposals.  To  portray  the  consistency  debate  just  as  a  political  norm  to  empower  the 
Commission furthermore conflicts with the evidence.  Even two proposals by some of the most 
supranational actors – Spinelli (1984) and the Commission (1990) – recognized the specific nature 
of  foreign  policy  requiring  specific  tasks  for  the  Commission.  This  does  not  fit  in  with  the 
expectation that the Member States would be discussing legitimate internalized formats. Mimetic 
isomorphism also has problems to explain the failures of the Member States to delegate tasks (e.g.  
the Genscher-Colombo Plan, Spinelli draft Treaty, Dutch Presidency Black Monday draft Treaty) or 
cases of non-delegation (e.g. Single European Act, Amsterdam Treaty). In fact it has little to say 
about the timing of delegation or to which actor tasks are delegated.
The functionalist argument of the need for consistency, combined with a strong sense of 
sovereignty, is more convincing. From the very start, the Member States recognized that economic 
integration and foreign policy coordination could not function as two completely separate entities. 
When the functional need to connect both arrived with the sanction dossiers, the Commission was 
tasked to provide the bridge. The moment that the German Democratic Republic had to be included 
in the Community, the officials of the Commission were again in lead. In the preparatory talks over 
the  Amsterdam  Treaty,  the  relationship  with  the  Commission  was  explicitly  stressed  when 
empowering the Council Secretariat. Finally, the Court of Justice recognized that the Commission 
was in charged of cross-pillar dossiers during the ECOWAS case.  What is more, the efficiency 
explanation  is  also  powerful  when  analysing  instances  of  non-delegation.  Grandiose  plans  for 
institutional  development  (e.g.  the  Dutch  draft  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty)  that  did  not  take  the 
pragmatic  route  and  stressed  functionalism  generally  failed  in  the  context  of  foreign  policy 
coordination. Rationalists argue that cost-benefit analyses inform decisions. Only when the Member 
States could benefit from the expertise of the Commission they delegated tasks in the sensitive field 
of foreign policy. This was only the case in cross-pillar dossiers. The function of the Commission is  
to provide consistency.
The Lisbon Treaty was quite ambitious in terms of foreign policy by bring external relations 
in the first pillar together with foreign policy. The Member States, however, explicitly chose to give 
the resources to the EEAS, over which they have more control. As the External Action Service is  
geared toward bringing more horizontal and institutional consistency, the underlying rationale that 
had empowered the Commission over the decades disappeared.  As a result,  the Member States 
could  once  again  keep the  Commission  at  arm's length.  The need for  consistency explains  the 
demand for the services of the Commission. It helps us to understand its rise and fall.
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